"Efficient Allocation with Informational Externalities" - Job Market Paper.We consider a seller of an item who faces potential buyers whose valuations depend on multiple signals. The seller has the ability to control the order in which buyers' signals arrive, but cannot observe these signals directly. It is known from the literature that when there are informational externalities and signals arrive all at once efficiency is unattainable. We show that by designing the order in which signals arrive, the seller can attain efficiency even in the presence of informational externalities.
"Optimal Allocation with Partial Commitment" - joint with Ran Weksler (in progress)We consider a principal that needs to allocate a single good among multiple agents. Each agent wants to receive the good and holds partial information about the principal's payoff from allocating the object to him. There are no monetary transfers. The principal can commit to a test that reveals partial information about her payoff from allocations. However, the principal cannot commit to an allocation rule. We show that although the principal lacks the ability to commit to an allocation rule and despite the fact that agents hold state-independent preferences, effective information may be transmitted from the agents to the principal via cheap talk communication. We characterize the information structures that support effective information transmission and analyze how information transmission considerations affect the optimal test choice of the principal.
"Implementation with Interdependent Payoffs"We consider the problem of implementation in a model with agents who have interdependent payoffs. We show that in such a model, under mild restrictions on the behavior of the decision rules and the structure of the valuation functions, ex-post implementation is impossible. Given profiles of valuation functions and distributions of signals, the set of Bayes–Nash implementable decision rules in any interdependent payoffs setup is equal to the set of Bayes–Nash implementable decision rules in the independent private values setup. For each decision rule in this set we construct a transfer scheme that implements it in a Bayes–Nash equilibrium in the independent private values setup and in every interdependent payoffs setup.
"Implementation in Models of Independent, Private, and Multivariate Values"We consider the problem of implementation in models of independent private values in which the valuation an agent attributes to a particular alternative is a function from a multidimensional Euclidean space to the real line. We first consider implementation by standard mechanisms, that include a decision rule and a profile of personal transfers. We present impossibility results on the implementation of decision rules that assign different outcomes to profiles of signals that result in the same profile of valuations. We then consider implementation by extended mechanisms that include, in addition to a decision rule and a profile of personal transfers, a profile of functions that affect the arguments of the valuation functions. We show that decision rules that assign different outcomes to profiles of signals that result in the same profile of valuations can be implemented by such mechanisms.