BOAZ ZIK

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. candidate in Economics and Rationality Studies — 2013-
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Expected completion date: June 2018

M.A. in Economics and Rationality Studies, *Magna cum Laude* — 2013
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

B.A. in Economics and Law — 2009
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Economic theory, Mechanism design, Information economics.

REFERENCES

Professor Alex Gershkov
Department of Economics and Center for the Study of Rationality –
Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Department of Economics –
University of Surrey.
Email: alex.gershkov@mail.huji.ac.il

Professor Ilan Kremer
Department of Economics, School of Business Administration, and Center for the Study of Rationality –
Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Department of Economics –
University of Warwick.
Email: ikremer@huji.ac.il

Professor Motty Perry
Department of Economics –
University of Warwick.
Email: motty@huji.ac.il

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant at the Hebrew University in the following courses:

- Mechanism Design (graduate course)
- Microeconomics A (graduate course)
- Macroeconomics A (graduate course)
- Price Theory 1 (undergraduate course)
- Price Theory 2 (undergraduate course)

- Introduction to Econometrics (undergraduate course)
- Macroeconomics A (undergraduate course)
- Macroeconomics B (undergraduate course)

RESEARCH PAPERS

"Efficient Allocation with Informational Externalities" - Job Market Paper.
We consider a seller of an item who faces potential buyers whose valuations depend on multiple signals. The seller has the ability to control the order in which buyers' signals arrive, but cannot observe these signals directly. It is known from the literature that when there are informational externalities and signals arrive all at once efficiency is unattainable. We show that by designing the order in which signals arrive, the seller can attain efficiency even in the presence of informational externalities.

"Optimal Allocation with Partial Commitment" - joint with Ran Weksler (in progress)
We consider a principal who needs to allocate a single good among multiple agents. Each agent wants to receive the good and holds partial information about the principal's payoff from allocating the object to him. There are no monetary transfers. The principal can commit to a test that reveals partial information about her payoff from allocations. However, the principal cannot commit to an allocation rule. We show that although the principal lacks the ability to commit to an allocation rule and despite the fact that agents hold state-independent preferences, effective information may be transmitted from the agents to the principal via cheap talk communication. We characterize the information structures that support effective information transmission, and analyze how information transmission considerations affect the optimal test choice of the principal.

"Implementation with Interdependent Payoffs"
We consider the problem of implementation in a model with agents who have interdependent payoffs. We show that in such a model, under mild restrictions on the behavior of the decision rules and the structure of the valuation functions, ex-post implementation is impossible. Given profiles of valuation functions and distributions of signals, the set of Bayes–Nash implementable decision rules in any interdependent payoffs setup is equal to the set of Bayes–Nash implementable decision rules in the independent private values setup. For each decision rule in this set we construct a transfer scheme that implements it in a Bayes–Nash equilibrium in the independent private values setup and in every interdependent payoffs setup.

"Implementation in Models of Independent, Private, and Multivariate Values"
We consider the problem of implementation in models of independent private values in which the valuation an agent attributes to a particular alternative is a function from a multidimensional Euclidean space to the real line. We first consider implementation by standard mechanisms, that include a decision rule and a profile of personal transfers. We present impossibility results on the implementation of decision rules that assign different outcomes to profiles of signals that result in the same profile of valuations. We then consider implementation by extended mechanisms that include, in addition to a decision rule and a profile of personal transfers, a profile of functions that affect the arguments of the valuation functions. We show that decision rules that assign different outcomes to profiles of signals that result in the same profile of valuations can be implemented by such mechanisms.

CONFERENCES AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

Conference on Economic Design, University of York 2017

Seminar in Economic Theory, Hebrew University	2014, 2015, 2017
Annual Rationality Retreat	2014, 2015

SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

Balzuska Scholarship for Excellent Students in Economics	2015
Jacques Nass Prize for a paper in political economy	2014
Rationality Center Scholarship	2010-
M.A. Fellowship (Excellent Student), Hebrew University	2009, 2010

OTHER

Academic advisor for economics students, Hebrew University	2011-

Languages – Hebrew and English
Date of birth – December 24, 1980
Citizenship – Israeli