BOAZ ZIK

Institute for Microeconomics University of Bonn
Lennéstraße 37, Bonn, 53113

Phone: +49 1514 5979961 (mobile)
Email: bzik@uni-bonn.de
Homepage: http://boazzik.com

CURRENT POSITION

Postdoctoral Researcher, Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn

EDUCATION

Ph.D. candidate in Economics and Rationality Studies Hebrew University of Jerusalem	2013-
M.A. in Economics and Rationality Studies, *Magna cum Laude* Hebrew University of Jerusalem	2013
B.A. in Economics and Law Hebrew University of Jerusalem	2009

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Economic theory, Mechanism design, Information economics.

REFERENCES

Professor Alex Gershkov
Department of Economics and Center for the Study of Rationality –
Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Department of Economics –
University of Surrey.
Email: alex.gershkov@mail.huji.ac.il

Professor Motty Perry
Department of Economics –
University of Warwick.
Email: motty@huji.ac.il

Professor Ilan Kremer
Department of Economics, School of Business Administration, and Center for the Study of Rationality –
Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Department of Economics –
University of Warwick.
Email: ikremer@huji.ac.il

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant at the Hebrew University in the following courses:
- Mechanism Design (graduate course)
- Microeconomics A (graduate course)
- Macroeconomics A (graduate course)
- Price Theory 1 (undergraduate course)
- Price Theory 2 (undergraduate course)
- Introduction to Econometrics (undergraduate course)
- Macroeconomics A (undergraduate course)
- Macroeconomics B (undergraduate course)

"[Efficient Allocation with Informational Externalities](#)" - Job Market Paper.
 We consider a seller of an item who faces potential buyers whose valuations depend on multiple signals. The seller has the ability to control the order in which buyers' signals arrive, but cannot observe these signals directly. It is known from the literature that when there are informational externalities and signals arrive all at once efficiency is unattainable. We show that by designing the order in which signals arrive, the seller can attain efficiency even in the presence of informational externalities.

"[Cheap Talk in Allocation Problems](#)" - joint with Ran Weksler
We consider a partially informed principal who needs to allocate a single good among multiple agents. Each agent wants to receive the good and holds partial information about the principal's payoff from allocating the object to him. Both the agents' and the principal's signals are ordered in the first-order stochastic dominance sense. We show that effective information may be transmitted from the agents to the principal via cheap-talk communication despite the fact that each agent always prefers to receive the good. We characterize the information structures that support effective information transmission, and analyze how information transmission considerations affect the optimal signal function of the principal.

"[Ex-Post Implementation with Social Preferences](#)"
The current literature on mechanism design in models with social preferences discusses social-preference-robust mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are implementable in any environment with social preferences. The literature also discusses payoff-information-robust mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are implementable for any belief and higher-order beliefs of the agents about the payoff types of the other agents. In the present paper we address the question of whether deterministic mechanisms that are robust in both of these dimensions exist. We consider environments where each agent holds private information about his personal payoff and about the existence and extent of his social preferences. In such environments a mechanism is robust in both dimensions only if it is ex-post implementable, i.e., only if incentive compatibility holds for every realization of payoff signals and for every realization of social preferences. We show that ex-post implementation of deterministic mechanisms is impossible in such environments; i.e., deterministic mechanisms that are both social-preference-robust and payoff-information-robust do not exist.

"[Implementation in Models of Independent, Private, and Multivariate Values](#)"
We consider the problem of implementation in models of independent private values in which the valuation an agent attributes to a particular alternative is a function from a multidimensional Euclidean space to the real line. We first consider implementation by standard mechanisms, that include a decision rule and a profile of personal transfers. We present impossibility results on the implementation of decision rules that assign different outcomes to profiles of signals that result in the same profile of valuations. We then consider implementation by extended mechanisms that include, in addition to a decision rule and a profile of personal transfers, a profile of functions that affect the arguments of the valuation functions. We show that decision rules that assign different outcomes to profiles of signals that result in the same profile of valuations can be implemented by such mechanisms.

CONFERENCES AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

Seminar in Economic Theory, Bar-Ilan University	2018
Young Researcher Day, University of Haifa	2018
Conference on Economic Design, University of York	2017
Seminar in Economic Theory, Hebrew University	2014, 2015, 2017
Annual Rationality Retreat	2014, 2015

SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

Balzuska Scholarship for Excellent Students in Economics	2015
Jacques Nass Prize for a paper in political economy	2014, 2018
Rationality Center Scholarship	2010-2018
M.A. Fellowship (Excellent Student), Hebrew University	2009, 2010

OTHER

Academic advisor for economics students, Hebrew University	2011-2018
Languages – Hebrew and English	
Citizenship – Israeli	